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Abstract 
The present paper aims at contributing to the literature on children welfare evaluation 
by  taking  into  account  for  intra-household  distribution  of  resources  and,  as  a 
consequence, intra-household inequality. This task cannot be accomplished within the 
standard framework of unitary model of consumption, and equivalence scales helps 
only partially, since their scope is different. To investigate what happens within the 
family's black box we refer to collective models, recovering information about the 
decision of how resources are distributed within the household. We use the estimated 
sharing  rule  to  draw  some  conclusions  about  the  role  played  by  intra-household 
inequality for children welfare in Albania and look at the effects that different public 
policies  can  have  on  child  welfare.  We  find  that  taking  into  account  for  intra-
household inequality raises the Gini of children welfare by nearly 10 percentage points 
and  that  in-kind  transfers  are  more  effective  than  cash  transfers  in  ameliorating 
children well-being. 
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It is common opinion that one of the main aim of a modern society is to take
care of its more vulnerable members. Several categories of individuals fall into the
de¯nition of vulnerable person: disables, people su®ering from chronic illness, jobless,
and so on. Children are part of this list for several reasons, and even though they
usually do not su®er of critical living conditions, the policy maker should always
pay particular attention to child well-being, an investment for the future of their
country. With this paper we aim at contributing to the literature on children welfare
evaluation by taking into account for intra-household distribution of resources and,
as a consequence, intra-household inequality.
This task cannot be accomplished within the standard framework of unitary
model of consumption: in these models the reference unit is the household, which
is seen as a black-box within which consumption decision and resources allocation
processes are unknown and assumed to be non-relevant. For example, one may
assume that the household head takes all the relevant decisions, including child
consumption, and that this is not important for the welfare of the household. Such
an assumption is unsatisfactory for the purposes of the paper, since it would imply
that a su±cient measure of the welfare of household's members is per-capita income.
Equivalence scales partially deal with this problem taking into account for family
composition, which implies assigning to each household member a weight according to
which individual equivalent income can be computed (Sydenstricker and King, 1921;
Pollak and Wales, 1981). However, the use of ¯xed equivalence scales, a common
practice in the applied poverty and inequality literature, could lead to ignore impor-
tant household characteristics and the associated behavioral characteristics. These
factors are particularly relevant in developing world where cultural aspects and socio-
economic conditions may strongly in°uence intra-household inequality. Moreover, as
pointed out by Ebert and Moyes (2003, 2009), for the computation of the equivalence
scales, only the cost of maintaining a child should be taken into account. In contrast
with the cost of raising a child (Browning, 1992), the former includes only child's
basic needs, such as, for example, food, clothing and housing.
The discussion about the use of a more or less restricted monetary value of child
welfare to correct poverty and inequality measures of a country is beyond the scope of
the paper. However, what sounds clear to us is that to measure the welfare of a child,
taking into account only for his/her basic needs is not su±cient. As a consequence,
we need a measure of children well-being that accounts for the actual distribution of
resources within the household. This decision is crucial for evaluating child welfare,
especially for poorer households, where the amount of resources small and the welfare
2loss caused by an unfair intra-household distribution may be relatively large.1
To investigate what happens within the family's black box we refer to the col-
lective model of Chiappori (1988, 1992). This framework allows to spot some light
into the household decision about resources distribution. Keeping the assumption
of Pareto e±cient choices, this approach assumes that the distribution of resources
within the household is governed by a function of exogenous factors, which is called
\sharing rule". The identi¯cation of this function helps us to look inside the black
box for two reasons: ¯rst, it allows to recover individual preferences, and hence indi-
vidual welfare; second, it provides information on how decision to allocate resources
within the family is taken, potentially allowing for public interventions aiming at
favoring a more equal intra-household distribution. In other words, the welfare of
the household's members can be estimated directly rather than inferred from the
household's relative position with per-capita or equivalent income.
Traditionally, the measurement of monetary child poverty has been criticized
in favor of multidimensional indicators of children well-being. One of the main
point against monetary child poverty is that it implicitly assume that resources are
allocated equally within the family and in the same way between the households.
With the use of collective models this critic falls: some members of the household
may be relatively more or less poor than others.
In a public policy perspective, we have to say that a comprehensive normative
analysis of the implications of this class of models is still far from being complete.
However, Ebert and Moyes (2009) moved the ¯rst steps in this direction and, fol-
lowing the pioneering article of Bourguignon (1999), which shows the importance of
using collective models to analyze the cost of children, other authors followed the
intuition of using collective models to analyze individual poverty and intra-household
inequality (Cherchye et al., 2008; Lise and Seitz, 2007).
In line with this stream of literature we try explore new perspectives allowed by
collective models for child welfare analysis, following a theoretical approach similar
to Menon et al. (2008). In particular we look at the di®erence in the child welfare
distribution respect to a per-capita income approach and test whether receiving
public transfers could induce a modi¯cation of the sharing rule. To analyze in depth
these questions we focus on Albanian households with only children under ¯ve2 using
1It should be noted, however, that the question of intra-household distribution of resources is
relevant also at the aggregate level of welfare analysis. It may be the case that a rather large part
of the population su®ers from an unequal intra-household distribution with the consequence that
even when income distribution among households can be considered rather egalitarian, that society
could still be a®ected by a considerable level of inequality (see Peluso and Trannoy, 2007).
2We concentrate on these households to have a more homogeneous sample and to avoid possible
identi¯cation issues. More details can be fund in section 3.2.
3data from Albanian Living Standard Measurement Survey.
Albania is a particularly interesting setting where to study the welfare of children
and its relation with household decision processes. This country has been largely af-
fected by the passage on the market economy at the beginning of 1990 with the
children becoming the most vulnerable group su®ering sever poverty and malnutri-
tion problems. In spite the fact that Albania is the youngest country in Europe, with
the highest percentage of the under eighteen population, the social protection system
does not favor children and young people in any form. In fact, the social protection
system established during communist era has been progressively deteriorated from
the transition to a market economy.
Traditional Albanian household acquired renewed relevance after the fall of the
communist regime. At the end of the Second World War Albania still was a very tra-
ditional rural society with patriarchal family values, in mountain and rural area the
entire social and economic structure was governed by the Canon of Lek Dukagjini,
a set of traditional and unwritten laws, based on patriarchy and handed down from
the Middle Ages. This set of laws gave males unquestioned authority over females
(see Falkingham, 2001). During the isolationist Communist regime the educational
policies focusing on female education changed the patriarchal household. However,
the family maintained a central position in the society. With the regime's fall in
the 1990s and the following rise of uncertainty, the country self set back to a tra-
ditional family structure, even if large migration °ows added a new dimension to
the phenomenon, especially in the rural areas (see Danaj et al., 2005; Gjonca et al.,
2008).
Major problems are su®ered by the early childhood since the importance of chil-
dren's pre-school years is not widely understood in the country, especially in poor
areas of the north. The supply of public child care services is very poor and no safety
nets measures targeted to households with young children exist: at the moment, the
family is still the only institution able to protect vulnerable children.
In such a context it is important to look inside the household and study the
relation between adulthood and childhood in terms of welfare allocation. When
designing family policies, for instance, the possibility of identifying how resources
are shared among household's members can be important to de¯ne eligibility rules,
bene¯ts schemes or to rank individuals in terms of equality. There it has been
shown that the impact of cash transfers on poverty among children depends on the
response of the household (Alderman et al., 1995). On the other hand, there is a
growing evidence that the identity of the recipient of a cash transfer does matter in
terms of outcomes (Alderman, Chiappori, Haddad, Hoddinott, and Kanbur, 1995;
Du°o, 2000). Thus a social planner aiming to reduce child poverty through cash
4transfers should implement policy designs that ensure that cash transfers targeting
poor children result in improvements in children's welfare, and/or investment in their
human capital.
To our knowledge, in the literature there are no other empirical studies on the
link between public transfers programs (both cash and in-kind) in developing or
transition countries and intra-household distribution of resources, but, even if we
cannot compare our results with previous works, our ¯ndings seem rather clear.
These ¯ndings seem to support those critical toward neo-classical theory of public
transfers and the advantage of conditional transfers programs like those implemented
in many Latin America countries. Attending pre-schooling for young children is on
the contrary a variable favoring their share of resources within the family, suggesting
the goodness of in-kind programs.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the theoretical
model, the speci¯cation of the demand system and the issue of the econometric
identi¯cation of the sharing rule. In Section 3 we describe the econometric model
and the data used to estimate the collective demand system. Section 4 illustrates
our results and Section 5 concludes the paper.
2 Resources allocation and consumption decisions
2.1 The theoretical framework
Unitary models of consumption are derived via maximization of household utility,
which depends on consumed quantities of some market goods, subject to a budget
constraint. Consumption of individuals is not modeled and income pooling is as-
sumed. The collective model, ¯rstly introduced by Chiappori (1988, 1992), extends
the unitary framework to recover individual preferences introducing a function, the
sharing rule, which determines the proportion of household resources devoted to each
household member.
As a consequence, in order to properly estimate a collective model, the crucial
point regards the estimation of the sharing rule, and in particular its econometric
identi¯cation. Available cross-sectional datasets are usually collected at the house-
hold level, hence, in general, it is not possible recover individual preferences. In such
a context, the sharing rule is not identi¯ed. However, the additional information
needed to identify the sharing rule is not much and is usually available to the re-
searchers. In practice, it is su±cient to observe private consumption of at least one
market good (Bourguignon, 1999; Bourguignon et al., 2009; Chiappori and Ekeland,
52006, 2009a).3
There are mainly three empirical approaches for the identi¯cation of the sharing
rule. The ¯rst approach is proposed by Chiappori (1992) and several successive
works, and consists in assuming that leisure time is an exclusive good that a member
of the household consumes when not working. Observing leisure time of each member
and evaluating it at some market (potential) wage, it is possible to identify the
sharing rule by means of a labor supply model. This approach is by construction not
feasible if one seeks for the adult/children sharing rule since children do not work
and, more importantly, do not have any (potential) wage.
The second approach proposed by Browning et al. (2006) assumes that there
is no change in preferences when passing from single to married. Using available
information on singles one can estimate individual preferences. These preferences
are applied directly to each member of the couple, recovering the sharing rule by
\di®erence". Again this approach is not applicable to the case of children (not to
mention that it is subject to a strong behavioral assumption).
The third approach for the identi¯cation of the sharing rule, consists in using
available information on consumption of exclusive or assignable goods. If the survey
records at least one expenditure category which can be exclusively assigned to just
one member of the household, then it is possible to identify the sharing rule. This
method shares its theoretical foundation with the ¯rst approach, but uses a di®erent
source of identi¯cation, individual consumption rather than leisure time, within a
di®erent framework, consumption demand rather than labor supply (Browning et al.,
1994).
The choice of the proper approach depends on the available data and on the
purposes of the analysis. In this paper, since we are interested in measuring children
welfare, we are forced to use the third approach. The expenditure dataset used in this
paper provides information on several exclusive goods, child clothing, adult cloth-
ing, child shoes, adult shoes, education (assigned to children), alcohol and tobacco
(assigned to adults).
To properly describe the theoretical model, it is important to distinguish between
ordinary, assignable and an exclusive goods.
De¯nition. A good is ordinary when private consumption of this good is not ob-
served or deducible.
This is the common case in household expenditure surveys. The good will be
3If private consumption of one good is observed, and there are no externalities, for a given
observed demand g(p;y) satisfying the Collective Slutsky property and such that the Jacobian
Dpg(p;y) is invertible, then the sharing rule is identi¯ed.
6consumed by each member of the household, but it is impossible to know in which
proportion. Examples are numerous, and include food, communications, recreation
and so on.
De¯nition. A good is assignable when it is consumed in observable proportions by
each member of the household.
For example, if we have information on how far is working place of each member,
we could assign traveling expenditure proportionally, if both spouses work.
De¯nition. A good is exclusive when private consumption of a good is observed
for an identi¯able member of the household.
This is the case of toys or schooling expenditures, which should be consumed only
by children.
Assume that an household is composed by two members, an adult and a child.
The vector of households consumption4, denoted by x, is composed of ordinary goods
o and exclusive (or assignable) goods ea and ec, and is additively separable, i.e.
x = xa +xc.5 Individual consumption xa and xc is not observed, while expenditures
and prices of the exclusive goods (ea, ec, pa and pc) are observed and exogenous.
For explanatory purposes, but without loss of generality, assume the vector x to be
composed by one ordinary good o, with price normalized to 1, and two exclusive goods
ea and ec, with prices pa and pc respectively. Assume also that the household is not
engaged in production and that labor supply is ¯xed. As a consequence, household
income is exogenous and assumed to be approximated by total expenditure of the
household, denoted by y and equal to p0x, with p =f1;pa;pcg and x = fo;ea;ecg.












k ¸ 0;o ¸ 0; k = a;c;
4If not di®erently speci¯ed, when we talk about consumption goods or vectors we always refer
to quantities. In general, superscripts indicate the household member, in our case adult and child,
subscripts indicate a speci¯c good.
5In this study, we do not take into account public household goods, as housing, traveling costs
and so on. The reason is that the inclusion of such goods implies the adoption of a household
production function, possibly whit economies of scale which, in absence of the proper information
in the data, would cause identi¯cation issues for the sharing rule.
7where Ák amount of resources devoted to member k, or, in other words, the sharing
rule governing the intra-household allocation of resources.
In this framework, the sharing rule can be viewed as a sort of contracting tool
through which household members decide how to distribute resources between them
and represents the link between the household and individual level of the decision
process. Once each member's resources are assigned he/she will maximize his/her
utility subject to its own budget constraint. Thanks to this link, and provided that we
are able to properly estimate the sharing rule, we can recover individual preferences,
and hence individual welfare measures, from household data.
For the econometric identi¯cation of the sharing rule, we use a technique borrowed
from Pollak and Wales (1981) and Lewbel (1985), commonly used to incorporate
demographic variables or exogenous factors into demand functions, and from Bollino
et al. (2000), used to estimate household technologies.
In general, demographic functions interact with exogenous prices or income and
can be identi¯ed provided that there is su±cient information and variability in the
data. The analogy steams from the use of an interaction term with income a la Barten
(Barten, 1964) for the identi¯cation of the sharing rule, where the estimation problem
is similar to that of estimating a regression containing unobservable independent
variables.
In the next section we de¯ne the demand system speci¯cation and provide a
theoretical evidence of the identi¯cation of the sharing rule.
2.2 Model speci¯cation and identi¯cation of the sharing rule
To derive the chosen speci¯cation of collective demand system we start from a
quadratic extension of the Almost Ideal Demand System (Deaton and Muellbauer,
1980) proposed by Banks et al. (1997).
Budget shares for a Quadratic Almost Ideal Demand System (QAIDS) are spec-
i¯ed as
wi(y;p;µi) = ®i +
X





where wi(y;p;µi) is the good i budget share, µi = f®i;°ij;¯i;¸ig are parameters, pj
is price of good j and y is total expenditure. a(p) and b(p) are two price indexes,
de¯ned as
lna(p) = ®0 +
X












8When demographic modi¯cations a la Gorman are introduced (Gorman, 1976),
demographic characteristics interact multiplicatively with income in a theoretically
plausible way (Lewbel, 1985; Perali, 2003). Budget shares are modi¯ed as follows
wi(y;p;µi) ) wi(y;d;p;µi) = wi(ti(y;d);p;µi); (5)
where ti(y;d) is the income translating function and d is a vector of demographic
variables or household characteristics.
Applying this transformation to equation (2), we obtain the following demograph-
ically modi¯ed budget share equation
wi(y;p;d) = ®i+ti(d)+
X













¤ = lny ¡
X
i ti(d)lnpi: (8)
In order to comply with homogeneity properties of the demand system, this spec-
i¯cation of the budget shares demand system is subject to a number of restrictions
on the parameters. In particular, to satisfy linear homogeneity in p and Slutsky
symmetry the following restrictions must hold
X
i ®i = 1;
X
i ¯i = 0;
X
i ¸i = 0;
X
i °ij = 0;
X
j °ij = 0; °ij = °ji;
(9)
while, as proven in Perali (2003), to ensure that the modi¯ed cost function maintains
the homogeneity property, demographic parameters must satisfy
X
i ¿ir = 0: (10)
To next step to obtain the collective QAIDS introducing the sharing rule. The
maximization problem in (1) states that the sharing rule determines (the natural
logarithm of) the amount of resources that each household member receives. Being
the decision process individual rather than centralized, each member decides how to
9allocate his share of total expenditure according to
w
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Note that, as stated before, the two individual demand equations can be summed to
form the household demand equation. In this equation some individual parameters
cannot be identi¯ed either because of collinearity, for example we cannot identify
two constants in the same equation, or because of data construction, for instance
prices and demographic characteristics are recorded at household level and are likely
to be same for all household members (in our case they are). Hence, summing up
the demand equations for the adult and the children results in
wi(y;d;p;µi) = ®i + ti(d) +
X
j °ji lnpj (12)
+ ¯
a

















We could say that here household expenditure has been divided into the adult and















where lnÁk(pa;pc;y;s) is the sharing rule of the kth household member, pa and pc
are the prices of the exclusive goods, and s is a set of household/environmental
characteristics which is likely to in°uence the intra household resource distribution
but not the overall household demand (the literature often refers to s as \distribution
factors").
Note that in general the resources allocation decision process may be dependent
on households or individual characteristics. In fact, households with comparable
levels of income and prices may have di®erent sharing rules, which may depend on
several factors, as the social background, education of the adults and so on. To
take into account for this heterogeneity, we de¯ne the sharing rule as a function
10of observed individual expenditure yk; price of the exclusive goods pa and pc; and
a vector of other exogenous characteristics s, managed in analogy with Barten's


















In equation (15), mk(pa;pc;s) is an individual income scaling function, de¯ned
over individual prices and a set of distribution factors s.
The identifying assumption in the model is that the portion of income of each
member, yk; can be recovered from observed expenditures on exclusive or assignable
goods. In practice, observed individual income yk is determined on the basis of the
ratio of the expenditure in exclusive goods, rk. If we assume that adult's expenditure
is de¯ned as the expenditure on his exclusive good ea plus half of expenditure in


















From equations (15) and (17) it follows that we can write the sharing rules as
functions of household income, individual prices, distribution factors and the ratio

















Since lnÁa(pa;pc;y;s)+lnÁc(pa;pc;y;s) = lny; by de¯nition and ra lny+rc lny =








To save on notation, let us set lnma(pa;pc;s) = lnm(¢) and lnmc(pa;pcs) =
¡lnm(¢). Substituting (18) into (13) we obtain
lny
a¤ = r





c lny ¡ lnm(¢) ¡
X
i ti(d)lnpi: (21)
11In analogy to function ti(d), function m(¢) is identi¯ed provided that there is
enough variation in distribution factors s and prices pa and pc, and as long as the
distribution factors di®er from the demographic variables d. The proof is similar to
proving that function ti(d) is identi¯ed, for which we suggest to refer to Gorman
(1976), Lewbel (1985).
In our empirical exercise, we specify the m(¢) function as a Cobb-Douglas func-
tion, so that the logarithmic speci¯cation is linear, that is
lnm(p
a;p
c;s) = Á0 lnp + Á1 lns1 + Á2 lns2 + ::: (22)
The resulting model is similar to that proposed by Menon et al. (2008) with a
di®erent target: in their work the analysis was focused on couples without children,
while we clearly aim at determining children welfare.
In the following section we report the econometric tools employed in the estima-
tion of the collective demand system (12).
3 Empirical strategy
3.1 The econometric speci¯cation
Econometricians working with household micro-data often are faced to the zero ex-
penditures problem, especially when working with disaggregate goods. Coe±cient
estimates can be biased when only observed positive purchase data are used, hence it
is necessary to apply the proper correction technique. There are several econometric
methods to correct for zero expenditures which di®er in the assumptions related to
the source of zeros. For example the tobit model (Maddala, 1983; Amemiya, 1985)
captures the corner solutions for the utility maximization problem, which imply that
the observation is zero just because the household decided to consume zero on the
basis of disposable income, prices and its preferences. This could be the case for
some goods, but for some other not. For example semi-durable goods (as clothing)
may not be purchased in the reference period simply because they give utility for
more than one period and a household may need to buy them only once in, say, 3
months. This situation is called infrequency of purchases, and cannot be properly
captured by a tobit model.
The Double-Hurdle model (Yen, 1993), on the other side, assumes that zero
expenditures are explained by a decision process that arise from unobserved latent
variables which drive consumer choice. The model allows a separate estimation of
participation and expenditure parameters. This is the case of alcohol, which may
12be not consumed because of moral conviction or health problems, which are not
observable in the survey. Again this model is not suitable when we consider semi-
durable goods, as clothing.
An alternative to the double-hurdle model is the Heckman correction model,
which assumes that zero expenditures are due to sample selection bias (Heckman,
1979) and are treated as a misspeci¯cation error. This purely statistical approach
allows to obtain di®erent estimates for participation and expenditure parameters,
with the participation choice is assumed to dependent on partially di®erent observ-
able variable with respect to the consumption equation.
In the original model, the ¯rst stage determines the participation probability
using a probit regression, and in the second stage, a speci¯cation for the omitted
variable can be used to correct, if present, sample selection bias. The omitted variable
is known as the inverse Mill's ratio, which is the ratio between density and cumulative
probability function of the standard normal distribution of the probability to observe
a positive consumption.
In this paper we use a generalization of the Heckman correction model which
overcomes the issues observed by Amemiya (1978, 1979). In particular, we refer to the
work of Shonkwiler and Yen (1999), which shows the inconsistency of the Heckman
estimator and proposes a consistent, though still simple, two-stages estimator for a
system of censored equations.
In choosing the proper estimator, we have to keep in mind that we have zero ex-
penditures for all the goods except for food. Hence, we decided to use the Shonkwiler-
Yen estimator which is well suited for a rather large source of zero expenditures, and
is still consistent with a two-stages decision process (similar to that of the double-
hurdle).
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where i represents the ith demand equation and t the tth observation, wit and cit
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is the demand function, zit is vectors of exogenous variables, ±i are parameters, and
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where ª(z0
it±i) and Ã(z0
it±i) are univariate standard normal cumulative distri-
bution function and probability density function respectively. The system can be
estimated by means of a two-step procedure, where ±i are are estimated using a
Maximum Likelihood probit estimator, and used to predict ª(z0
it±i) and Ã(z0
it±i).
Successively, estimates of µi and ´i in the system
wit = ª(z
0
it^ ±i)w(y;d;p;µi) + ´iÃ(z
0
it^ ±i) + »it (25)
are obtained by Full Information Maximum Likelihood.
Besides that of zero expenditures, another problem arises: we lack information
on prices and/or unit values. Since the World Bank survey records only expenditure
information, the lack of information about quantities purchased precludes the pos-
sibility to derive household speci¯c unit values. On the other hand, World Bank's
price indexes have an aggregation level similar to that of the survey but are not su±-
cient to provide plausible elasticities. For this reason, we use a procedure, originally
proposed by Lewbel (1989) to construct pseudo unit values. Without entering into













where exi is expenditure on the i-th good, wij is the subgroup budget share. Good
i is a good of the demand system, which is the aggregation of j subgroup goods (for
example food is the aggregation of vegetables, meat, ..., and so on). k¤










where kij = mean(wij) is the mean subgroup budget share.
3.2 Data
The data used in this paper are draw from the World Bank Living Standard Mea-
surement Survey collected in Albania in 2002.6 These data contain information on
6We do not use 2005 data because it was not possible to reconstruct the consumption categories
from the row data as we needed. This is due to some intermediate datasets which are not included
in the available data and cannot be reconstructed from the do ¯les provided by the World Bank.
14household consumption, socio-economic conditions of the household and individual
variables related to education, labor market and health. The original sample covers
3,599 households, but we selected households with only under-¯ve children remaining
with a sample of 511 households.
The decision to drop families with children older than ¯ve is due to several reasons.
First, we are interested most in studying the welfare of young children within the
family and the support of public policies for early childhood. Since schooling is
mandatory for children aged 6 and more, we identi¯ed pre-schooling as a relevant in-
kind public transfer which is likely to a®ect child welfare. Second, under-¯ve children
are not a®ected by the phenomenon of child labor which can in°uence the children's
bargaining power, representing an unobservable factor di±cult to treat in our study.
Other reasons are related to the implemented empirical strategy. We estimate the
sharing rule of an equivalent household composed by one adult and one child and
look at the proportions of individual expenditures as a source of identi¯cation for the
sharing rule, controlling for household composition at the household level. However,
the presence of children of very di®erent age would severely a®ect both the sharing
rule and the overall demand of goods causing an identi¯cation issue for the sharing
rule (Chiappori and Ekeland, 2009b).7
The estimation of the demand system is conducted over 5 categories of goods:Food,
Alcohol and Tobacco, Clothing, Meat, Housing and Other goods.8. Household-
speci¯c prices, or pseudo unit values, of these goods are assigned following the pro-
cedure described in section 3.1.
As proved in Section 2.2, the identi¯cation of the sharing rule comes from two
observed individual expenditure. In this dataset, we have more than that. Both
clothing and footwear are recorded for males, females and children. Moreover, tak-
ing into account that we only have children under ¯ve, it is su±ciently safe to assume
that consumption of alcoholic beverages and tobacco is exclusive to the adults. We
also assume that the expenditure in education is exclusive to the children (we con-
trol that only expenditures strictly related to pre-school are included). Finally, in
order to take into account for family composition we compute per-capita individual
consumption. In this way, within each household, we compute the individual ex-
penditures equivalent to an hypothetical household composed by one adult and one
child.
With the set of demographic variables that we use in the demand system, d,
7We plan to deal with this problem in a future paper, where we plan to extend the collective
model to take into account of resources distribution among males, females and children simultane-
ously.
8To avoid unnecessary complications we consider only non durable goods.
15we partially try to recover the gender dimension which has been neglected in our
model because of the choice of an adults/children sharing rule.9 These variables are:
a dummy variable indicating that females are more than males in the household, a
dummy indicating high level of education of household's head, dummies capturing
if head or the spouse are chronically ill or disable, variables on family composition
(number of children, number of adults and number of elderly), a variable indicating
multiple couples within the family (enlarged families), a subjective self declaration of
the basic needs income, a subjective declaration of socio-economic status, a dummy
taking "1" if the household is bigger than 100 squared meters, a dummy for telephone
owner and a dummy indicating that al least a member has emigrated abroad after
the pyramids crisis (1997).
The distribution factors s chosen to be in the sharing rule are: the price ratio of
the two comparable exclusive goods (the price of adult clothing divided by the sum
of adult clothing and children clothing), household declaring to belong to religious
minorities (other than Muslim or orthodox) or not religious, a child is chronically
ill, both partner employed (bi-active couple), age ratio de¯ned as female age divided
by the sum of couple's ages, education ratio de¯ned as wife's years of schooling di-
vided by the sum of the couple's years of schooling, Ndihme Ekonomike participation
(meaning to be bene¯cial of a means testing anti-poverty cash program (for an ex-
tensive study on the welfare e®ects of the NE program in Albania, see Mangiavacchi
and Verme, 2009)), and attending early-childhood programs delivered by the public
sector (the variable takes "0" if no child attends pre-school in the family, "1" if at
least one child currently attends and "2" if all children are in early childhood public
programs). These last two variables are introduced to test the possibly di®erent im-
pact of cash and in-kind transfers. In fact, Ndihme Ekonomike is a sort of minimum
income cash program, while pre-schooling can be considered as the most important
in-kind transfer from winch a child is recipient.
As regards the variables used in the ¯rst stage probit estimates of the zero correc-
tion estimator,z, we use a larger set of variables than d, which we do not report here
to save on space, but is available upon request together with the tables of estimates
of all probit regressions.
9Indeed, the research focused on transfers between adults and children should not neglect trans-
fers between husbands and wives (Bourguignon, 1999).
164 Results
4.1 Estimatates
This section presents the results of the two-steps estimation of model (25). When
zero expenditure are observed for one good in the data, the ¯rst step estimates the
probability of observing a positive consumption as a probit via Maximum Likeli-
hood, while the second stage uses the predicted Mill's ratios to estimate the demand
system via Full Information Maximum Likelihood, imposing a-priori parameters' re-
strictions.10
In Table 1 we present the estimates of the collective QAIDS demand system.11
In general, income and price parameters are signi¯cant, with some exceptions, as
housing income parameter for adults and alcohol parameter for children, which are
all non signi¯cant. Among demographic variables, the general trend is towards small
parameters values, even if many are still signi¯cantly di®erent from 0 in particular
the interaction of higher education of the household head with income has a positive
in°uence on goods consumption, even if to be more educated do not determine more
alcohol and tobacco consumption. The number of children in the family in°uence
positively the household consumption of clothing and food, as expected, and to be
an enlarged family has a positive e®ect on food consumption. The consumption of
alcohol and tobacco has been in°uenced by having members emigrated abroad and by
the number of adults in the family. Other good is mostly composed by education and
cultural expenditures which is in°uenced positively by the education of household
head and by the self-reported socio-economic status.
Table 2 shows income income and price elasticities. Signs are consistent with
consumption theory, with negative own price elasticities. The relevant exception
is alcohol and tobacco price elasticity which is positive: this means that for this
very particular category of goods. This good su®ers of two di®erent e®ects on our
estimates: ¯rst, alcohol and tobacco is not consumed by the child, but he/she could
still in°uence household consumption in a way that may not be properly captured
by our model; second, Balkan countries have a strong smoking tradition and a huge
traditional consumption of raki.12; third, alcohol and tobacco are addictive goods
10Symmetry and homogeneity are ensured by construction, with the Slutsky matrix having two
individual income terms which sum up to the household income e®ect, because of the symmetry of
the individual transfers shown in equation (19).
11The parameters of the sharing rule are estimated simultaneously with the demand system, but
are reported in a separate table. Instead the estimates of the ¯rst stage probit regressions are not
reported: they are available upon request.
12Raki is a very strong liquor typical of Balkans.
17thus their consumption may not be much a®ected by their market prices.
According to their size, clothing and housing are the most elastic good to price
changes, while meat and food are the less elastic (we avoid commenting further
the price elasticity of alcohol and tobacco). As for income elasticities, since we could
estimate individual income parameters, we could also estimate individual elasticities.
For the adult, the most elastic good is clothing, while, as expected alcohol and
tobacco have the smallest elasticity. For the child, the larger elasticity belong to
other goods, which contains also educational and recreational expenses, hence this
result is expected. From a policy perspective this is an important result since it
means that more resources devoted to children in the household would end in human
capital investment. The less elastic good is alcohol and tobacco, which is around
zero. Since the child is under ¯ve, it is clear that he/she does not consume this good,
so the elasticity should be expected to be null.
To properly interpret the parameters of the sharing rule remember that ma(¢) =
m(¢) and mc(¢) = ¡m(¢), hence the estimated parameters refer to the sharing rule of
the adult, while the same parameters' values have the opposite e®ect on the sharing
rule of the child. Estimates of the parameters of the sharing function are reported
in Table 3 and tell us that the ratio between the prices of adult and child clothing
in°uences positively the propensity to allocate resources in favor of adults. This
suggests that subsiding child speci¯c goods would not have a positive in°uence on
children's welfare because this would increase the price ratio reducing the share of
resources of the child. The age di®erential between female and male (age ratio)
in°uence negatively child welfare: small di®erence in age between the partners may
indicated a balanced couple with more caring for their son/daughter. Even if to
receive a monetary support (Ndihme Economike) has not in°uence on children well-
being, attending a pre-school programs in°uence the distribution of resources within
the family in favor of child. This evidence seems to favor in-kind bene¯ts rather than
cash transfers for the welfare of children, at least from an intra-household perspective.
We should say that the NE cash transfer, while generally believed to be well targeted
thanks to a decentralized management, proved to quite non-e®ective in alleviating
poverty (WB, 2009; ?).
To detail further our analysis, we report ¯gures 1 and 2, which represent the
relative sharing rule, expressed as the ratio between children expenditure and to-
tal household expenditure (Ác(¢)=y). These pictures are drawn by means of non-
parametric regressions of the sharing rule on total household expenditure.
Figure 1 shows that share of child/adult expenditure goes from 21% for poor
households to 39% for higher income households. This di®erence between poor and
rich families is mostly driven by urban households, in fact if we look at ¯gure 2 it
18Figure 1: Children Relative Sharing Rule
is clear that the urban children in richest deciles have the highest income shares.
The socio-economic status in°uences positively the attitude toward children for the
households living in the cities. While in rural area distribution of resources within
the family are constant along households welfare distribution. This could be driven
by the scarce development of rural areas in Albania: even if the household is rich
there may not much to do for children with that money because of the absence of
toy-shops, recreational and cultural activity centers, fashion shops, and so on.
4.2 Child welfare, inequality and the e®ects of public trans-
fers on young children
The estimated sharing rule values refer to an hypothetical equivalent household com-
posed by two members: one adult and one child. In other words individual consump-
tion of adults and children, the source of sharing rule identi¯cation, are rescaled to
take account number of adults and children. If we want to say something more
general regarding children welfare and the e®ects on intra-household inequality, it is
19Figure 2: Children Relative Sharing Rule - Area
necessary to recover the real individual expenditure of each child in the family, given
the sharing rule that have been estimated.
In order to have proper data about individual child welfare we use the following




nc½c + na(1 ¡ ½c)
y (28)
where ½c is the estimated child's relative sharing rule, computed as Ác=y, nc and
na are the number of children and of adults in the household. The resulting values are
the actual share of total expenditure of each child and can be used to perform poverty
and inequality analyses of child welfare. In other words this is a sort of household
speci¯c equivalence scale, where the scales not only depend on household composition
and/or characteristics, but also on intra-household resources distribution.
In the following analysis we concentrate only on child welfare, discarding what
20Figure 3: Child Welfare using Intra-household Resources Allocation
happens to adults. Moreover, our sample is compose only by children under ¯ve,
hence the results are very speci¯c to this group of study and cannot be generalized
to the whole country. A more general analysis with gender di®erentiation and a
proper modeling of children of di®erent ages is planned in a future paper.
Figure 3 shows the distribution of child welfare using the estimated share of chil-
dren consumption (continuous line) and the per-capita consumption measure (dash
line), computed assuming an equal distribution among household's members. The
kernel density distribution reveals that child welfare is distributed more unequally
if we consider also intra-household allocation and that the average level of child
consumption is lower. We have plotted also Cumulative Distribution Functions of
individual consumption shares and per-capita consumption to control for stochastic
dominance of the welfare distribution: taking into account intra-household inequality
child consumption is smaller both on average and along the whole distribution. Just
to give a crude number, child welfare inequality measured by the Gini index shift
from a 0.286 computed using per-capita consumption to 0.382 computed using the
sharing rule. Intra-household inequality accounts for almost ten percentage point
of the Gini index for young children in Albania. Despite the fact that our sample
selection strategy may be discussed, we should say that our sample excludes very
numerous households, because the maximum age of children is set to ¯ve, hence we
could still underestimate child poverty and inequality.
Economists have traditionally been skeptical about in-kind measures, viewing
cash transfers as superior in terms of recipient's utility. From our estimates of the
sharing rule (Table 3), instead, we can see that family allowances have no e®ects in
the proportion of resources allocated to young children while pre-school participation
(an in-kind transfer) has a positive impact. To explore further the e®ects of public
21transfers on child welfare, we have depicted again non parametric regressions of
individual child sharing rule selecting the fact of being recipient of a public transfer.
Figure 4: Children Sharing Rule - Pre-Schooling
Figure 4 shows the children sharing rule ½c of two groups of families: one with
no child attending early-childhood programs and the other with at least one child
currently attending to pre-school. The sharing rule of attending children is nearly
constant along the consumption distribution and close to .4. On the other hand, the
sharing rule for non-attending children is sort of U shaped trend, where the lowest
and highest income families seems to have more care for their children. The di®erence
of the two sharing rule is signi¯cant along the whole income distribution, con¯rming
the correspondent sharing rule parameter.
Looking at the e®ects on intra-household inequality of public cash transfers (Fig-
ure 5 shows a families receiving or not the NE bene¯t) we ¯nd that households that
receive a monetary bene¯t have a lower sharing rule manly if they are middle or
higher income. The poor household, well targeted and e®ectively in needs of a min-
imum income, do not show a signi¯cantly di®erent behaviour whether they receive
or not the bene¯t. Nonetheless, it seems that the share of aid that would go to the
22Figure 5: Children Sharing Rule - Ndhime Ekonomike
child is rather low, around .2. On the other hand, the leakage households (not poor
but bene¯ciary) behave more egoistically toward their children respect to similar
household not receiving the bene¯t.
These considerations are partial, both because the reference sample is not rep-
resentative of the whole Albanian population and because the analysis is subject to
further improvements. However, the evidence seems in favour of the use of collective
models for welfare analysis. There are simply too many aspects that with an unitary
approach cannot be taken into account.
5 Conclusions
In this paper we have applied the collective framework to the measurement of intra-
household inequality and child welfare in Albania. Albanian households have been
deeply a®ected by transition to market economy coming from a regime that revolu-
tionized the previous patriarchical tradition. The e®ect of the transition seem to be
23that of bringing back those traditional values, with a marginal roles for women and
negligence toward childhood, very persistent especcially in rural area. At the same
time, household structure is changing deeply in Tirana and migration have a®ected
strongly family's equilibria. To open the family's black-box in this case is highly
relevant to study individual welfare and evaluate the impact of public policies.
We have shown that intra-household inequality plays an important role in deter-
mining individual welfare and inequality, with a Gini index for children stepping up
by 10 perchentage points when we compare child welfare computed using the sharing
rule versus per-capita income. We have also tested whether receiving public transfers
induces a modi¯cation of the sharing rule respect to similar households who do not
bene¯t. We ¯nd that in-kind transfers are likely to improve the situation of children
within the household for all income level. On the other hand, cash transfers seem
not to ammeliorate the relative position of children within the household, suggesting
that if properly conceived, in-kind transfers can be e®ective, both because well tar-
geted and because they reply to precise needs. To properly analyze these questions
we focus on Albanian households with children under ¯ve only, using consumption
variables present in the Albanian Living Standard Measurement Survey.
To our knowledge, in the literature there are no other empirical studies on the
link between public transfers programs (both cash and in-kind) in developing or
transition countries and intra-household distribution of resources, but, even if we
cannot compare our results with previous works, our ¯ndings seem rather clear.
These ¯ndings seem to support those critical toward neo-classical theory of public
transfers and the advantage of conditional transfers programs like those implemented
in many Latin America countries. Attending pre-schooling for young children is on
the contrary a variable favoring their share of resources within the family, suggesting
the goodness of in-kind programs.
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27Table 1: Parameters and Demographic Variables of the Collective Demand System - 2002
Meat Clothing Housing Alcohol/Tobacco Others Food
Parameters
®i 0.0697 0.1619 0.0052 -0.0218 0.0890** 0.6959***
(0.0671) (0.1104) (0.0316) (0.0612) (0.0399) (0.1198)
°ji 0.0079 0.0033 -0.0003 -0.0067** -0.0002 -0.0040
(0.0054) (0.0055) (0.0018) (0.0032) (0.0021) (0.0058)
-0.0730*** 0.0125*** -0.0085 0.0067 0.0590***
(0.0111) (0.0041) (0.0067) (0.0041) (0.0084)
-0.0241*** 0.0083 0.0061** -0.0024








i 0.0141 0.0309*** -0.0018 -0.0290*** -0.0286*** 0.0144
(0.0099) (0.0101) (0.0033) (0.0058) (0.0060) (0.0132)
¯c
i -0.0025 0.0485*** -0.0008 -0.0333*** 0.0167*** -0.0286
(0.0082) (0.0183) (0.0039) (0.0053) (0.0057) (0.0240)
¸a
i -0.0040** 0.0054*** -0.0002 0.0020** 0.0053*** -0.0086***
(0.0018) (0.0016) (0.0005) (0.0008) (0.0008) (0.0020)
¸c
i -0.0039** 0.0108*** 0.0014** 0.0007 0.0028*** -0.0117***
(0.0019) (0.0023) (0.0006) (0.0009) (0.0009) (0.0033)
´i -0.0823 -0.2323*** 0.0334 -0.0266 -0.0237
(0.0626) (0.0549) (0.0262) (0.0177) (0.0164)
Demographic variables
Females more than males in hh 0.0217* -0.0165 -0.0045 0.0103 -0.0015 -0.0095
(0.0121) (0.0184) (0.0039) (0.0075) (0.0049) (0.0183)
Hh head has university or higher 0.0057 0.0687*** 0.0225*** -0.0055 0.0171*** -0.1085***
(0.0146) (0.0203) (0.0049) (0.0087) (0.0059) (0.0213)
Hh head is in bad health -0.0129 0.0103 0.0016 0.0057 0.0050 -0.0097
(0.0096) (0.0136) (0.0032) (0.0054) (0.0041) (0.0139)
Spouse is in bad health -0.0332*** 0.0275 ** 0.0042 0.0017 -0.0049 0.0047
(0.0093) (0.0128) (0.0031) (0.0059) (0.0041) (0.0135)
Number of children under 5 -0.0014 -0.0234*** -0.0005 -0.0019 0.0031 0.0240***
(0.0066) (0.0088) (0.0024) (0.0039) (0.0027) (0.0087)
Number of adults 0.0073** -0.0119** 0.0005 0.0047** -0.0043** 0.0037
(0.0037) (0.0057) (0.0013) (0.0023) (0.0017) (0.0057)
Number of elderly 0.0255** 0.0064 -0.0034 0.0020 -0.0017 -0.0288*
(0.0109) (0.0153) (0.0035) (0.0061) (0.0044) (0.0166)
Multiple couple within the hh -0.0192* -0.0303* 0.0044 -0.0003 -0.0014 0.0468***
(0.0114) (0.0165) (0.0038) (0.0063) (0.0045) (0.0167)
Subjective basic needs income 0.0067 0.0185** -0.0023 -0.0030 -0.0006 -0.0194**
(0.0055) (0.0085) (0.0022) (0.0039) (0.0024) (0.0089)
Subjective socio-economic status 0.0011 0.0034 0.0016* -0.0027 0.0060*** -0.0093**
(0.0027) (0.0037) (0.0009) (0.0019) (0.0011) (0.0040)
Dummy house bigger than 100m 0.0091 0.0111 0.0033 0.0051 -0.0024 -0.0262*
(0.0092) (0.0128) (0.0030) (0.0057) (0.0042) (0.0137)
Dummy having a telephone -0.0064 0.0260* 0.0055 0.0014 -0.0053 -0.0212
(0.0113) (0.0143) (0.0038) (0.0066) (0.0044) (0.0158)
Dummy member migrated 0.0039 -0.0175 -0.0030 0.0151*** 0.0010 0.0004
(0.0077) (0.0110) (0.0027) (0.0049) (0.0033) (0.0116)
28Table 2: Household's Income and Price Elasticities - 2002
Meat Clothing Housing Alcohol/Tobacco Others Food
Income (adult) 0.9756 1.6491 0.9041 0.4333 0.6318 0.9609
Income (children) 1.0613 1.1542 0.8104 -0.0077 1.6207 1.0163
Meat -0.9558 0.0256 -0.0027 -0.0491 -0.0059 -0.0493
Clothing -0.0977 -1.9339 0.1245 -0.1121 0.0201 0.1957
Housing 0.0410 0.4370 -1.8052 0.2914 0.2254 0.0960
Alcohol/Tobacco 0.0628 -0.1524 0.2739 0.5824 -0.2686 0.0764
Others -0.0851 0.4330 0.5115 -1.0835 -1.4147 0.3858
Food -0.0023 0.1009 -0.0036 -0.0536 0.0113 -1.0296
Table 3: Sharing Rule Parameters in m(¢) - 2002
Price ratio 3.0117***
(1.1644)
Dummy for other than Muslim or Orthodox 0.1549
(0.1519)
Dummy for child ill 0.1085
(0.1524)






Dummy for Ndhime Ekonomike bene¯ciary 0.2022
(0.1436)
Children attending pre-schooling -0.6237***
(0.1059)
29